Influenza 2005: The Laboratory's Role in Pandemic Preparedness & Response

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Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene December 6, 2005

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Agenda

- Overview of Influenza Antigenic Characteristics
- · Overview of Laboratory Diagnostic Methods
- Surveillance for New Strains of Influenza Viruses
- · Current Pandemic Concerns
- Pandemic Preparedness Activities
- The Laboratory's Role in Pandemic Preparedness & Response

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Influenza: Resources

- CDC home page for influenza
 - http://www.cdc.gov/flu http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm
- U.S. web site for pandemic flu & U.S. Pandemic Flu Plan and Preparedness Planning http://pandemicflu.gov/
- W.H.O. home page for influenza (including avian influenza)

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en/

Influenza: Resources

- Promed (Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, International Society for Infectious) http://www.promedmail.org
- U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
 - "Cautions in Using Rapid Flu Tests" http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/tips/rapidflu.html
- Review of Performance Characteristics of Rapid Tests: Uyeki TM. *Influenza diagnosis and treatment in children: a review of studies on clinically useful tests and antiviral treatment for influenza*. Pediatr Infect Dis J 2003; 22:164-77.

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Influenza: Safety

- Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Version 2.3; July 20 2004 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance
- Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), 4th ed http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm



Overview of Influenza Antigenic Characteristics

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Influenza – The Virus

Family: Orthomyxoviridae Genera: 3 Influenzavirus Types

- **A & B** & C

- Type B influenza viruses only infect humans.

- <u>Type A</u> influenza viruses infect humans & birds & other mammals.

Influenza A Subtypes:

Human - $\mathbf{H_1N_1},\,\mathbf{H_3N_2},\,\mathbf{H_1N_2},\,\mathbf{H_2N_2}$

Birds - H₁ to H₁₆, N₁ to N₉

Bird \rightarrow Human - H_5N_1 , H_9N_2 , H_7N_7 , H_7N_2 , H_7N_3

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Location of Original
Isolation
Isolation
Isolation



Original Lab ID # Subtype (Influenza A Viruses Only)

Strains: (2005-6)

A/California/7/2004 (H₃N₂)-like A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H₁N₁)-like

B/Shanghai/361/2002-like

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
Influenza Antigenic Change- A Hallmark

Antigenic Drift

- Process of <u>gradual and continuous change</u> in HA and NA glycoproteins
 - Accumulation of point mutations in the genes during viral replication
- Occurs with <u>both</u> influenza A and B, leading to new viral strains
- · Allows for repeated infections over a lifetime
- Responsible for annual epidemic

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Annual Epidemic (Interpandemic) Influenza, Wisconsin, 1996 - 2005 Number of Specimens Tested and Positive for Influenza by Culture at Wisconsin Virology Laboratories Wisconsin Virology Laboratories



Influenza Antigenic Change- A Hallmark


Antigenic Shift


- Process(es) whereby existing surface HA and/or NA proteins are replaced by HA and NA proteins that are *significantly different (novel)*.
- Occurs <u>only</u> with influenza A and leads to a new *viral* subtype
- An abrupt change, infrequent and unpredictable
- Can result in a pandemic influenza

What is Pandemic Influenza?

- Results from a *novel subtype* of influenza A virus to which the overall population possess no immunity
- Occurrence in multiple or widespread geographic areas worldwide; locally explosive epidemics
- Associated with unusually high rates of morbidity and mortality
- Extremely rapid global spread
- Multiple waves of disease

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Overview of Laboratory Diagnostic Methods

Labora	atory Diagno	sis of Influenza
Test Method	Time to Results	Comments
Culture	1-10 days	Still gold standard(?), requires expertise, provides virus for studies
Molecular (RT-PCR)	2-4 hours	Becoming gold standard(?), requires expertise & expensive equipment
Antigen Detection (IF)	2-4 hours	Requires reading expertise & IF microscope
Serology	>2 weeks	Retrospective, requires paired sera
Antigen Detection (Rapid EIA-like)	15-30 minutes	Widely available, requires little expertise

Rapid EIA-Like Tests				
Test	CLIA Status	Antigen Detected		
Clearview Flu A/B	Non-Waived	A & B		
Directigen Flu A	Non-waived	A		
Directigen Flu A & B	Non-waived	A & B		
Directigen EZ Flu A + B	Non-waived	A & B		
Flu OIA	Non-waived	A/B		
Flu OIA A/B	Non-waived	A & B		
NOW Flu A and NOW Flu B	Waived/Non-waived	A & B		
BinaxNOW Influenza A & B	Waived	A & B		
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Laboratory Diagnosis of Influenza

Laboratory Diagnosis of Influenza Rapid EIA-Like Tests (continued)

Test	CLIA Status	Antigen Detected
QuickVue Influenza	Waived	A/B
QuickVue Influenza A + B	Waived	A & B
SAS Influenza A and Influenza B	Non-Waived	A & B
Xpect Flu A & B	Non-waived	A & B
ZstatFlu	Waived	A/B

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Rapid Influenza Tests

Advantages

- · Rapid turn-around time
- · "Stat" testing possible
- · Rapid outbreak identification
- Cost-effective (?)
- Wide-spread testing possible Biosafety issues
- · Less expertise required
- · Optimize antibiotic and antiviral usage

Concerns

- Performance Characteristics:
 - Poor PVP early & late season
 - Poor test sensitivity→Impact on PVN
- · Supplies of test kits
- · Loss of isolates for further characterization
- · Loss of surveillance data

Rapid Tests: Optimizing Use


- · Educate clinicians on predictive values & limitations of test results
- · Confirm early, late and out-of-season positives
- · Confirm peak-season negatives, if applicable
- Recognize the value of negative results.
- Use prevalence indicators to decide:
 - When to test
 - When to qualify result
 - When to confirm results


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Rapid Tests: Biosafety Concerns in an Age of **Emerging Diseases**

Reasons for Concern: SARS, avian influenza, influenza A (H2N2) Addressing the Concerns:

- · Enhance communication with ID Drs., Infection Control
 - Need patient travel history
- · Perform risk assessment
- · Consider strategies to enhance biosafety
 - Use BSC, additional PPE, isolated testing area
- Need for a new model for biosafety in the laboratory?
 - Universal ("Standard") precautions for blood in the 80's
 - Enhanced precautions for suspect EIDs in the 2000's?






Surveillance for New Strains of Influenza Viruses


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
Objectives of Influenza Surveillance


- Determine when influenza viruses are circulating*
- Determine where influenza viruses are circulating*
- Determine how much influenza activity is occurring (intensity and impact)
- Identify the types & strains of circulating influenza viruses*
- Detect unusual events
 - Infection by unusual viruses*
 - Unusual syndromes caused by influenza viruses
 - Unusually large/severe outbreaks of influenza
 - Increased mortality
- Optimize use of vaccines & antivirals*

*Laboratory contributions









Elements of Laboratory-Based Surveillance

- Selected patient samples and viral isolates for testing at State Laboratory
- Weekly reports of number & types of specimens tested and test results
- Communication/information about unusual occurrences, current status of influenza activity
- · Education for clinicians and test sites of implications of prevalence, use and interpretation of tests

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Recommendations to Enhance Laboratory-Based Surveillance

- Develop algorithms for use of PCR for surveillance by state public health laboratories
- Incorporate rapid test sites as key partners
- Incorporate molecular sites in influenza surveillance
 - Provide public health testing protocols
 - Provide clinical testing data
 - Refer samples for test verification, confirmatory testing & subytping and repositories
- Expand influenza surveillance to year-round

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Current Pandemic Concerns





Direct Interspecies Transmission of Avian Viruses to Humans Exposed to Infected Poultry



- 1997: 18 cases of respiratory illness caused by HP avian H5N1; 6 deaths Hong Kong
- > 1998/9: 7 cases of respiratory illness caused by H9N2; no deaths China, HK
- > 2003: 2 additional HP H5N1 cases; 1 death – China, HK
- 2003: >80 cases of infection by HP H7N7 avian viruses; 1death – The Netherlands
- 2004: 2 cases of infection by HP H7N3; no deaths - British Columbia
- 2004-2005: Additional cases of H5N1 in Southeast Asia

2004-2005: H5N1 in Southeast Asia



July-October, 2005: H5N1 in Birds



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization

Human H5N1 Cases Reported to WHO Through November 17, 2005

11070111001 17, 2003					
Country	H5N1 Cases	Deaths	Case Fatality		
Cambodia	4	4	100%		
Thailand	21	13	62%		
Indonesia	11	7	64%		
Vietnam	92	42	46%		
China	2	1	50%		
Total	130	67	52%		

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Avian (H5N1) Influenza Situation Update – November 18, 2005

- Expansion of geographic and host range via wild birds
- · Continuing large outbreaks in domestic fowl
- In human isolates so far, all genes of avian origin
- Viral resistance to adamantanes; sensitive to oseltamivir
- Continued evolution of pathogenicity & antigenicity
- No evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission!

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AVIAN INFLUENZA (H₅N₁)

The Recipe For a Human Pandemic

- ➤ Emergence of a <u>novel subtype</u> of influenza ➤ An immunologically naïve population
- ➤ Replication in humans → disease
- > Efficient human-to-human transmission

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An Influenza Pandemic Will be Unlike A Bioterrorism Event or A Natural Disaster

- Inevitable yet unpredictable vs. imminent, overdue???
- Widespread, not focused like a bioterrorism event
 - Will be a global event
 - Will affect entire national infrastructure rapidly
- Effect will be relatively prolonged, weeks to months, occurring in waves
- May have unique age predilection

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PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

Risk Communication

Walking the fine line between "appropriately sounding the alarm" and "causing panic"


The Arrival of Avian Flu in the U.S.???


Article from Orlando Sun Times,

"Beloved Duck at Theme Park Succumbs to Mystery Flu"



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Pandemic Preparedness Activities:
A State Priority

Wisconsin Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness

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Booksom of Padde Hoofts
Department of Birth and Family Services

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
	Interpandemic period	
Phase 1	No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low.	
Phase 2	No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.	
	Pandemic alert period	
Phase 3	Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.	
Phase 4	Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.	
Phase 5	Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).	

W.H.O. Framework for Pandemic Planning
(continued)

Pandemic period
Phase 6 Pandemic phase: increased and sustained transmission in general population.

Postpandemic period
Return to interpandemic period.

The Laboratory's Role in Pandemic Preparedness & Response



Interpandemic/Pandemic Alert Influenza: Laboratory Responsibilities

- · Perform diagnostic testing
- · Support surveillance activities
 - Seasonal influenza
 - Novel influenza subtypes
- Participate in pandemic planning and exercises
- Develop/review pandemic response plans and checklists
- · Educate clinicians and laboratorians

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Pandemic Influenza Period: The Laboratory's Responsibilities

Clinical Laboratories

- Perform diagnostic testing for influenza (stat)
- Maintain other diagnostic services
- Support surveillance activities
- Continue clinician education
- · Other?

Public Health Laboratories

- · Maintain surveillance activities
- Conduct special studies with CDC
- Maintain reference testing for influenza
- Maintain emergency response for other outbreaks (e.g., foodborne)
- Continue education of clinicians & laboratorians
- Share data/information in "realtime"
- Maintain other diagnostic services?
- Other?

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Pandemic Influenza Period: *The Impact on the Laboratory*

- · Staff shortages
- · Supply shortages
- Very high demand for diagnostic testing
- Continued need for routine (non-pandemic) work
- · Disruptions of medical community
- Severe disruptions of community infrastructure
- High visibility likely for laboratory

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Pandemic Influenza Period: Plan Now!

Issues & Options

• Staffing Shortages:

- "Continuity of Operations" Plan
- Cross-train
- Surge testing laboratories
- Temporary employment agencies
- Prioritize testing (influenza AND non-influenza)
- Identify other staff capabilities

· Supply Shortages:

- Stockpiles
- $\ Multiple \ vendors$

Pandemic Influenza Period: Plan Now!

Issues & Options

- Biosafety:
 - Risk assessment (specimen collection, testing processes)
 - Enhanced biosafety, e.g., PPE, sequestering work, barriers

· Protocols:

- Notification of changes to testing capabilities & schedules
- Clinical diagnosis vs. testing
- Specimen management
- Specimen referral to public health laboratory
- Employee health
- Alternate transport options

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Pandemic Influenza Period: Plan Now!

Issues & Options

• Training/Education:

- Cross-train staff
- Accelerated training protocol
- Clinician training

• Communications:

- Integration of laboratory planning with institutional plans
- Institutional prioritization
- Real-time information-sharing from PHLs to sentinel laboratories

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Pandemic Influenza Period: Plan Now!

- Develop/Review your "Continuity of Operations" Plan
- Develop checklist(s)
- Exercise
- Support surveillance for earliest detection
- Integrate plans with:
 - institutional plans
 - community plans
 - regional & statewide plans
 - other laboratories' plans
- Public health laboratories must accept responsibility for leadership in laboratory planning & response

